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8 July 1965

Attached are supplemental instructions to basic document of 30 June. Each division chief is requested to prepare information as follows:

1. Foreward

a. As explained in attachment, this is place to record some general considerations which you believe Planning Group should bear in mind regarding the nature and function of intelligence.

b. Please submit to Special Assistant by COB Monday, 12 July.

2. Assumption

a. Review attached assumptions as drawn up by ONE. Add to these if you like as pertinent to your experience and responsibilities.

b. If any, please submit by COB, Monday, 12 July.

3. Intelligence Objectives

a. See list of objectives in basic document for sample. Select or add to them as appropriate by using PNIO's or others of your own.

b. Please submit to Special Assistant by COB Monday, 12 July.


4. Programs

a. See attached sample. Do a sheet for each world area.

b. In upper right corner, write letter-number designation as appropriate:

Map Procurement (A-1); Map Library (A-2); Geographic Research (A-3); Cartographic (A-3); Publication (A-3); Editorial (A-3)

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c. Also, in that corner use appropriate world area (USSR, EE Satellites, Communist China and North Korea, Vietnam, Cuba, Free Far East, Middle East and South Asia, Africa, Latin America and Western Hemisphere, and Western Europe) and "F" Basic Intelligence.

d. Still in right corner, but underline as in sample, indicate Objective by identifying number according to your own list or by PNIO.

e. On top of sheet, explain program.

f. Opposite year, under columns A through E, indicate costs by Total Money, Man-year, Hardware, Capital Investment, and R&D. See sample for Explanation of Major Program Changes and Changes in Support Requirements.

g. Admin Staff should submit cost figures for Staff Overhead which will include all of O/DBI as well as assist division chiefs re foregoing.


h. Please submit to Special Assistant by COB Thursday, 15 July.

5. Major Problems and Prospects

(See attached instructions and submit by 15 July)

6. Recommendations

(See attached instructions and submit by 15 July)



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A. The principal antagonists of the US will be the USSR and Communist China.

Comment: I see no need, in Assumptions, to distinguish between the two, or to set forth the modes, methods, weapons, etc. with which these countries will pursue their antagonism. These are all subjects for Intelligence to work out, under the Plan; not to assume. But, if we had to cut down on the US intelligence effort, one way to do so would be to assume, for instance, that "the main threats to US security will arise from China" and that "the threat from the USSR will be less significant than that from China."

B. Other Communist countries will be generally hostile to the US, and aligned, with varying degrees of firmness, either to the USSR or to Communist China.

Comment: Perhaps we should say "Most other Communist countries. . . ." Yet the statement, without the "most," illustrates a formulation which, though not a very good Estimate, is probably a good Assumption for an Intelligence Plan.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

D. Most other countries of the world -- especially the "underdeveloped" countries -- will be unstable to varying degrees in their domestic affairs and their international alignments. The attitudes and actions of even the weakest of these states may, according to circumstance, be of importance to US security.

Comment: Surely a good example of a broad Assumption. It could be narrowed, but just how? (Note, however, that if the broad Intelligence Plan is broken down into several area or regional plans, each of these plans might have Assumptions which would usefully narrow its scope.) I would reject all Assumptions about the modes of instability, or the reasons for it, or the importance of economic development, population growth, etc. These are aspects of Intelligence itself, not Assumptions on which a broad Intelligence Plan should be based. But you could have an Assumption somewhat as follows: "The policies of most countries, and especially of underdeveloped countries, will depend to a significant degree on the rate of social and economic advance in those countries, and on the relation of that rate to popular expectations."

E. Nuclear war, involving the US, will remain a possibility during the period of this Plan.

Comment: I really think that this is an unnecessary Assumption -- it is subsumed under A, as explained in the comment on A. But I suppose we have to have it. There is no need to specify whether nuclear war is general or limited. Once you've got this Assumption, however, you have to add the next:

S-E-C-R-E-T

F. Non-nuclear wars, limited wars, wars of national liberation, and armed rebellions will occur from time to time in various areas. Most of these conflicts will involve US interests to some degree; some of them will threaten US security interests, some will involve US armed forces.

7. These are all the Assumptions I would recommend. There could be plenty of others many of which I would regard as unnecessary. For example, there is no need to assume the absence of general disarmament; or the absence of world economic depression, etc. I do not think it necessary to mention communism as an ideology, or Vietnam. There are also obvious Assumptions about US policy and objectives, but these are prudently left unformulated. And so on.

8. But I am aware, as stated at the beginning, that the Assumptions I have listed do precious little to restrict the scope of intelligence planning. We could go further in this respect. The best way to do so would be to select certain areas, countries, or subjects which, by Assumption, could be ignored in an Intelligence Plan. This is dubious business, unless we are forced by financial or intellectual stringencies to rule certain interesting intelligence problems out of the account altogether.

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S-E-C-R-E-T

9. Finally, concerning priorities. To some degree the Assumptions formulated above imply orders of priority -- A versus B, for example, and C versus all the rest. Yet these are very general. The further elaboration of priorities is certainly an important aspect of an Intelligence Plan -- it could be in the Plan itself, or the Plan could provide for PNIO's, perish the thought, and so on, in even greater detail. Perhaps the core problem for the Board to consider, in connection with this Assumptions exercise, is whether more could be done in the Assumptions to delimit and restrict the area of intelligence activity which must be planned for. I fear that if we do not do it in the Assumptions we shall have to do it in another paper. But I find it very difficult to do in Assumptions, unless there be a very long and detailed list, and such a long list is bad in principle.

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b. The Summary Sheet

This sheet is designed to integrate on an area basis the allocations of resources of your office to various intelligence functions. Ultimately, the office summary sheets will be combined into Directorate summary sheets and those in turn into Agency summaries, so that it will be possible to see how much effort, agency-wide, goes into various tasks or is applied to various geographic areas.

Note that there are to be separate sheets for each of ten areas; Vietnam has been designated as a separate area because of the size and complexity of the programs focussed on it.

Down the left side of the sheet the A,B,C,D,E line-items repeat those used in the program sheets for each year through 1970. Space is available at the bottom of the sheet for such rough estimates on men, money and materials and R&D as you may be able to make now for the 1971-75 and 1976-80 periods.

Across the top, the column headings are pretty self-explanatory. It is reasonable to expect that most offices will find their costs bunching in a few columns, with other columns completely blank.

Column G on Information Collection is to contain the costs of those collection programs the DD/I is responsible for, [REDACTED]

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25X1C

Column H - Information Processing - is to include the costs of handling the paper, dissemination, logging, etc., as well as the big sums allocated to various forms of automatic or electronic data processing.

Column I - Production Support - is to carry the costs of printing, graphics, editing and publication where these are borne within the office as distinct from Printing Services Division, etc.

Column J - Staff Overhead - is to carry the costs of administration, staffnicks, special assistants and the like, as well as costs of special office-wide programs not logically allocable to other functions.

Column K - General Operating Costs - is for the cats and dogs and fragments and loose change that won't reasonably fit elsewhere, as well as for basic costs--rent, miscellaneous labor, capital investment, etc. which are not assigned to a functional column.

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DDI Plan

**Foreword**

- I. Assumptions**
  - 1. Substantive
  - 2. Non-substantive
- II. Objectives**
  - 1. Substantive
  - 2. Non-substantive
- III. Programs**
- IV. Major Problems and Proposals**
- V. Recommendations**

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GROUP 1  
Excluded from automatic  
downgrading and  
declassification



**SECRET**

7 July 1965

DDI Planning Group

Outline of Plan (Supplement to 30 June Memo)

Foreword

You may introduce your contribution to the long range plan with general considerations which you believe the Planning Group should bear in mind, whether as caveats, exhortations, clarifications of the nature and function of intelligence, or lessons learned from your own past experience in the practical problems of the business.

I. Assumptions

1. Substantive

Attached is a copy of ONE's Memorandum No. 2 on Assumptions. You may not find it or the final revision, due 15 July, specific enough. State your own.

2. Non-substantive

Demands which will be made on your capabilities, your role in the intelligence community, availability of information, etc., - in short, major non-substantive developments and conditions which should be taken into account in planning because they will affect your programs.

II. Objectives

1. Substantive (required of those who "produce" intelligence).

Consult the PNIO's; adjust or add as required to express your intelligence objectives, bearing in mind that you are stating objectives for a long range plan. The PNIO's are annual and do not address themselves specifically to some long range objectives which should be considered in planning. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

How do you state your long range intelligence objectives in these cases and what programs are required to meet the objectives? Another example, our war in Vietnam. The current quarterly supplement to the PNIO's refers to the war in Vietnam but the last annual edition (Dec. '64) did not. Do we assume that the war in Vietnam will go on indefinitely? Perhaps we should assume that intelligence can shorten the war. How do you state your intelligence objectives and what programs do you have or should you have to achieve the objectives?

The intent of the above questions is not so much to get at what you had in mind implicitly or explicitly when the 5-year projections were submitted for the budget, but to get at programs we should have in mind to pull ourselves and the community together against common, long range objectives.

## 2. Non-substantive

This heading is to take care of the objectives of offices and functions which do not "produce" intelligence. It should also be used for objectives common to all offices in the DDI, at least some of which are listed under Planning Guides (See Attachment C to Memorandum of 30 June). The revised outline drops Planning Guides in the belief that those Guides which are appropriate to the DDI can better be expressed as objectives and thereby make us think in terms of programs which we have or should have to meet them.

(Note to both II 1 and 2 above: identify your objectives by letter - II 1 or 2 a,b,c, etc., in order, that they may be keyed to the program sheets).

III. Programs. Note that the revised outline omits "Goals". Objectives are goals.

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Attached are two sample formats, one for particular programs and the other for a summary of programs.

1. The program sheet: legal size, 5 copies  
Allow 2 inch margin on left

State the program briefly beginning at top left of page.

In upper right corner give the following in this order,

DDI/office or staff

Category (as per outline in  
Appendix A to 30 June memorandum)

Subcategory (as per same)\*

Objective (identify according  
to your own list and/or by  
PNIO number)

Proceed as per sample program sheet. Letters used at head of columns under Program Cost stand for total money, personnel, hardware, capital investment, and R&D in that order. If the headings "Explanation of Major Program Changes" and "Major Changes in Support Requirements" are inadequate for your problems, use what is left of the sheet (or another sheet) for "Comment." Be sure to state your requirements for substantive support, e.g. political research. Where you can, give the timing of major changes according to whatever estimates you have for reference.

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- \* Where subcategory will not fit (Current Intelligence, Estimates, and NIS) because all regional or country subcategories are involved, use "Current", "Estimate", or "Basic" as appropriate.

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Although you are expected to follow the regional breakdown given in Appendix A to the Memorandum of 30 June, emend it (further subdivision and/or cross-reference) as necessary in order to state programs which should not be obscured under regional headings; e.g., program Vietnam, either because of obvious present and foreseeable priority or because of anticipated emergence of a country or problem as an objective of major importance.

Avoid overlap in Costs for programs as best you can. When you cannot, estimate the extent of overlap in a footnote or Comment.

2. The summary sheet (Explanation and instructions will follow).

#### IV. Major Problems and Proposals

If you had something to say in the Foreword, this is where you carry on. If you passed on the Foreword, this is where you stop and give your ideas about major problems which you foresee for CIA and the intelligence community during the next 15 years -- changes in focus, orientation, and organization of intelligence activities that you believe should be considered; activities that should be re-examined, etc. Be brief, but get the major things down on paper -- and off your chest. The following are examples of what we mean: the nature and depth of political research required, its proper locus in the Government; adequacy of exchange on developmental research between S&T components and other components in the Agency, arrangements for improvement; research which can be done adequately under external contract and research which should be done by analysts within the Agency, arrangements for former - a "captive" institute?

#### V. Recommendations

This is not meant to be pro forma. It will be taken for granted that you recommend your own programs.

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Program: To determine the current situation and future prospects for the economic development of Communist China particularly as they relate to: internal stability, the capacity to support a major war and those foreign economic relations of importance to U.S. security.

DDI/RR  
A-3  
I. China  
B. Econ.  
II. A. \_\_\_\_\_  
or  
PNIO 6

Program Cost						Explanation of Major Program Changes	Major Changes in Support Requirements
Year	A	B	C	D	E		
1966	Cost (No)	Cost	Cost	Cost	Cost	1. We expect a significant increase in flow of intelligence information during the next 3 to 5 years. This will require a build up in research staff trained on Chinese economy and in Chinese language. Will permit a reduced effort to obtain many answers by indirect methods.	1. Increased need for Chinese language training. 2. Increased need for computer services. 3. etc.
1967	"	"	"	"	"		
1968	"	"	"	"	"		
1969	"	"	"	"	"	2. With build up in China's advanced weapons programs there will be increased demands from Defense and ACDA for major studies of the economic impact of these programs.	
1970	"	"	"	"	"	3. External aggression by China likely to increase over next 5-15 years -- perhaps against Soviet as well as Free World positions. This demands body of research materials which can be focused on variety of unforeseen problems.	
1975	Continued Expansion						
1980	Level Off						

Comment:

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GROUP 1  
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downgrading and  
declassification

Approved For Release 2001/11/20 : CIA-RDP79-01154A000600080007-0

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*1. Summary*  
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Sheets to be prepared for:

1. USSR
2. E. E. Satellites
3. Communist China *Asian*
4. Vietnam *East*
5. North Korea *Asia*
6. Free Far East (incl. SE Asia)
7. Middle East-South Asia
8. Africa
9. Latin America-Western Hemisphere